OPINION

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:

After a jury in California Superior Court convicted them each of murder, Robert McDaniels and Keelon Jenkins challenged their convictions in the California Court of Appeal. McDaniels and Jenkins argued that the prosecution had made racially motivated peremptory strikes during pre-trial jury selection. They did not, however, move to place the entire record of voir dire before the California Court of Appeal, nor did they ask that court to perform a comprehensive comparative juror analysis. The California Court of Appeal affirmed their convictions. McDaniels and Jenkins then filed federal petitions for writs of habeas corpus, which were denied by the district court.

We took their appeals en banc to clarify the scope of the record that federal courts may consider in habeas cases in which certain evidence was presented to the state trial court but not to any state appellate court. We conclude that, in such cases, federal courts may consider the entire state-court record, including evidence that was presented only to the trial court. We also consider and reject Petitioners' arguments that the California Court of Appeal's approach to evaluating Petitioners' challenges to the prosecution's peremptory strikes violated clearly established law. Having done so, we return the case to the original three-judge panel to evaluate whether, in light of the whole state-court record, the California Court of Appeal's rejection of Petitioners' challenges to the strikes was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

I.

McDaniels and Jenkins were tried together for murder in California Superior Court. During voir dire, the prosecution used peremptory challenges to strike seven of ten African-American prospective jurors from the venire. McDaniels and Jenkins objected, arguing that the prosecution's peremptory challenges were racially motivated in violation of People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978). Wheeler is "the California procedural equivalent of" Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), which prohibits the use of racially motivated peremptory challenges as a matter of federal law. Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 951 n. 2 (9th Cir.2010). "[A] Wheeler motion serves as an implicit Batson objection." Id.

Batson requires trial courts to follow three steps in adjudicating claims of racial discrimination during voir dire:

Davis v. Ayala, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2199, 192 L.Ed.2d 323 (2015).

Proceeding in accordance with this framework, the state trial court first found that the defendants had made a prima facie showing that the prosecution had made peremptory challenges on the basis of race. The prosecutor then offered justifications for the four peremptory challenges, arguing that his reasons for striking the jurors were all race-neutral. After hearing the prosecutor's proffered justifications, the state trial court rejected the defendants' Batson/Wheeler challenges. The trial court found the prosecutor's reasons for the peremptory strikes to be race-neutral, and concluded that "[i]t didn't appear here to be any type of racism going on."

The trial proceeded, and the jury found McDaniels and Jenkins guilty of murder. McDaniels and Jenkins renewed their Batson/Wheeler claims on appeal to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed their convictions. See People v. Jenkins, No. A095527, 2003 WL 22881662 (Cal.Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003) (unpublished).

Responding to the defendants' argument that, generally, "only African-American potential jurors were asked whether they could convict even if they felt sympathetic toward the defendants," the California Court of Appeal observed that "Jenkins identifies no less than six other jurors who were queried on this point." Id. at *4. Additionally, the court stated that "[e]vidence supporting such `comparative juror analysis' is properly considered on appeal only if it was presented to the trial court," and noted that "neither [Jenkins] nor McDaniels made this argument below." Id. The California Court of Appeal did not otherwise discuss comparative juror analysis, and it appears that neither McDaniels nor Jenkins requested that it do so.

The California Court of Appeal actually could not have conducted a comprehensive comparative juror analysis using the portions of the record in its direct possession because those portions did not include the entire record of voir dire. The trial judge had asked each prospective juror to complete a written questionnaire, but the portions of the record the parties presented to the California Court of Appeal did not include those questionnaires. The court also lacked a transcript of the first day of voir dire. There is no indication, however, that anything prevented McDaniels and Jenkins from adding this missing evidence to the record or that the California Court of Appeal was unable to exercise its discretion to do so sua sponte. See Cal. R. Ct. 12 (2002) (providing a procedure for "[a]ugmenting and correcting the record" on appeal "on motion of a party or [the reviewing court's] own motion").1 On the contrary, McDaniels and Jenkins successfully augmented the record on appeal with other materials at least once.

McDaniels and Jenkins sought review in the California Supreme Court, which was denied. After unsuccessfully seeking state post-conviction review, they both then filed federal habeas petitions reasserting their Batson claims. The habeas petitions were assigned to different judges of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The evidence before the federal district court included the juror questionnaires for the seated and alternate jurors and the transcript from the first day of voir dire, which had not been presented to the California Court of Appeal.2 The district court denied habeas relief in each case. Petitioners appealed, and their appeals were consolidated.

The three-judge panel that initially heard this appeal held that it could not consider the juror questionnaires or the transcript of the first day of voir dire—even though those materials were before the state trial court—because they were not presented to the California Court of Appeal. McDaniels v. Kirkland, 760 F.3d 933, 941-42 (9th Cir.2014). We had previously held in an unrelated case, however, that a federal habeas court may consider evidence that was before the state trial court, whether or not that evidence was subsequently presented to a state appellate court. Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218, 1226-27 (9th Cir.2013), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1285, 188 L.Ed.2d 314 (2014). Faced with this tension, we granted rehearing en banc. McDaniels v. Kirkland, 778 F.3d 1100, 1101 (9th Cir.2015).

II.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, sharply limits the availability of federal habeas relief. We may not grant habeas relief to "a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. . . with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the state court adjudication "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A Batson challenge may implicate either or both prongs of § 2254(d).

III.

We first consider whether the California Court of Appeal's decision was "contrary to" or "an unreasonable application of" clearly established Supreme Court precedent within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We conclude that it was not.

A.

Petitioners argue that the California Court of Appeal should have augmented the appellate record sua sponte to conduct comparative juror analysis based on the entire record of voir dire.3 In their view, the California Court of Appeal's failure to conduct a comprehensive comparative juror analysis sua sponte renders that court's decision contrary to or an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1). We reject this argument because no clearly established Supreme Court precedent at the time of the California Court of Appeal's decision in 2003 required state courts to conduct a comprehensive, sua sponte comparative juror analysis.

Batson itself neither engaged in nor required comparative juror analysis. "Batson did not specify the form of the trial court's inquiry into the prosecutor's motive, only that it must `undertake a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.'" Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1004 (9th Cir.2014) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712). Indeed, Batson specifically "decline[d] . . . to formulate particular procedures to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection to a prosecutor's challenges." Batson, 476 U.S. at 99, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Not until 2005—after the California Court of Appeal decision at issue here—did the Supreme Court even use comparative juror analysis to adjudicate a Batson claim. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005). As a consequence, as to state-court decisions made prior to Miller-El, we have "already addressed and rejected" the argument that state courts "unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when they declined to conduct a comparative juror analysis." Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218, 1224 n. 1 (9th Cir.2013), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1285, 188 L.Ed.2d 314 (2014).4

Petitioners nevertheless argue that Green v. LaMarque, 532 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir.2008), stands for the proposition that Batson requires comparative juror analysis. It does not. We stated in Green that "the [state] trial court failed to undertake `a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available,' including a comparative analysis of similarly situated jurors, as required by clearly established Supreme Court law at the time of the trial." Id. at 1030 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712). This statement may have been ambiguous as to whether Batson's "sensitive inquiry" requires comparative juror analysis, but, as we later explained, "the better reading of Green is that a comparative juror analysis is one of many tools available to undertake such a `sensitive inquiry.'" Murray, 745 F.3d at 1005 n. 3. In Green, the state court had entirely "failed to reach step three in the Batson analysis." 532 F.3d at 1031. In explaining the state court's error, we noted that Batson's third step "may include a comparative analysis of the jury voir dire and the jury questionnaires of all venire members." Green, 532 F.3d at 1030 (emphasis added). This permissive language cuts against the idea that Batson's third step must include comparative juror analysis. In this light, Green stands for the proposition that a state court must evaluate a prosecutor's proffered race-neutral justifications for peremptory strikes, and that this evaluation may include comparative juror analysis—not that a state court must conduct comparative juror analysis.5

Of course, the Supreme Court's Batson jurisprudence has evolved since the California Court of Appeal's 2003 decision at issue here. As the California courts have recognized, see People v. Lenix, 44 Cal.4th 602, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 187 P.3d 946 (2008), more recent developments in the law—most notably the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Miller-El—have clarified the role that comparative juror analysis plays in the adjudication of Batson claims. We have no need to address here the extent to which decisions like Miller-El may have established a rule that, when appropriately raised by the parties, "[c]omparative juror analysis . . . must be considered when reviewing claims of error at [Batson's] third stage," Lenix, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 187 P.3d at 950, 961. For present purposes all that matters is that, in 2003, Supreme Court precedent did not clearly require courts to undertake a comprehensive comparative juror analysis, sua sponte, in adjudicating a Batson claim.

B.

McDaniels also argues that the state trial court impermissibly combined Batson's second and third steps—the prosecutor's proffering of race-neutral reasons, and the trial court's evaluation of those reasons—and that the California Court of Appeal contravened Batson by failing to correct this error. We reject this argument, which reads the state trial court's decision too uncharitably.

Combining Batson's second and third steps would have been contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam) (a court "err[s] by combining Batson's second and third steps into one"); see also McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1223 (9th Cir.2000) (explaining that because "Batson [held] that a trial court has `the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination,'" "[a] court's refusal to second-guess the prosecutor's reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge" is contrary to Batson) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712). But we do not read the state trial court's ruling as having combined Batson's second and third steps. The state trial court clearly addressed Batson's second step, by finding that the prosecutor "articulated specific reasons other than race based reasons for exercising his peremptory challenges." The state trial court additionally found that there "didn't appear here to be any type of racism going on," which, though laconic, addressed Batson's third step. It would make little sense to read this latter statement as addressed to Batson's second step, because whether there actually was "any type of racism going on" in the prosecution's peremptory challenges is a different question from whether the prosecution offered race-neutral justifications for those challenges in the first place. The fairest reading of the state trial court's ruling is therefore that the court did find that the prosecution's proffered race-neutral justifications were genuine, even if its finding was terse. We will not strain to read the trial court's decision otherwise, for AEDPA "demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (per curiam).

Indeed, the brevity of the state trial court's ruling at Batson's third step seems easier to understand when considered in context. The trial court's terseness in ruling on the Batson/Wheeler challenges mirrored defense counsel's terseness in making those challenges in the first place. In raising their Wheeler objections, Petitioners identified seven African-American prospective jurors who were struck from the venire. The prosecution then gave a series of justifications—spanning five pages of transcript—defending its peremptory strikes. Faced with this extended explanation, Petitioners said almost nothing in response. Jenkins's trial counsel said only, "Submitted, your honor," without making any further argument. McDaniels's counsel asserted that "[it] sounded to me as if the only reason [the prosecution] challenged [prospective juror Reeves] peremptorily was because he was an African-American," and also that "I saw no hesitation when [the prosecution] asked [Reeves] those questions," but said little else. Given that defense counsel said almost nothing, it is understandable that the state trial court did not say more.

Because the trial court did not combine Batson's second and third steps, the California Court of Appeal could not have contravened Batson by failing to correct a non-existent error. Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal's decision was not "contrary to" or "an unreasonable application of" clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

IV.

Having resolved petitioners' challenges to the California Court of Appeal's decision under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), we next consider whether the Court of Appeal's decision was based on an "unreasonable determination of the facts" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). To be clear, our holding that the California Court of Appeal's failure to conduct a comparative juror analysis did not contravene law clearly established in 2003 does not resolve whether comparative juror analysis may reveal that the state court's decision rested on an unreasonable determination of the facts for purposes of § 2254(d)(2).

A federal court on habeas review of a Batson claim must consider the "`totality of the relevant facts' about a prosecutor's conduct" to determine whether the state court reasonably resolved Batson's final step. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)). The prosecution's treatment of minority jurors as compared to its treatment of nonminority jurors is among the facts indicative of the presence of a purpose to discriminate. See id. at 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317 ("If a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar non-black who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson's third step."). And, because "we are separated by time and distance from the proceedings," this comparative analysis is often the best if not "the only means we will have for assessing the state court's fact-finding." Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1005 (9th Cir.2014). A comparative analysis of the treatment of jurors may therefore be central to a federal court's review of whether a state court's findings as to purposeful discrimination were reasonable, regardless of the fact that the state court was not required by clearly established law to perform such comparisons. See id.

Miller-El itself demonstrated that a comparative juror analysis may be relevant to, if not dispositive of, a federal court's § 2254(d)(2) analysis in the context of a Batson claim. The Supreme Court therein conducted a comparative juror analysis in the first instance in the course of analyzing the reasonableness of the state court's factual determinations under § 2254(d)(2). Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 240-52, 125 S.Ct. 2317. These side-by-side panelist comparisons, along with other circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, led the Supreme Court to conclude that the state court's finding that the juror strikes were not racially motivated was "unreasonable as well as erroneous." Id. at 266, 125 S.Ct. 2317.

Similarly, it is well settled in our jurisprudence that comparative juror analysis is an important tool for assessing the state court's factual determinations under § 2254(d)(2). See Murray, 745 F.3d at 1005 ("[I]n order for us to discharge our responsibility under AEDPA to review a Batson claim under section 2254(d)(2), we often will have to conduct a formal comparative juror analysis[.]"). Our application of this tool on habeas review has, in some instances, revealed racial motivations behind peremptory strikes that convincingly undermined the prosecutor's stated justifications, see, e.g., Ali v. Hickman, 584 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir.2009), Green v. LaMarque, 532 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir.2008), and in others led us to uphold state court findings of lack of discrimination, see, e.g., Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1285, 188 L.Ed.2d 314 (2014); Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810 (9th Cir.2010); Briggs v. Grounds, 682 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.2012).6

In Jamerson, we set forth the procedure through which we carry out such a review when the state courts declined to conduct a comparative juror analysis in the first instance. First, "we must perform . . . the comparative analysis that the state court declined to pursue. Then, we must reevaluate the ultimate state decision in light of this comparative analysis and any other evidence tending to show purposeful discrimination" to decide whether the decision rested on objectively unreasonable factual determinations. Jamerson, 713 F.3d at 1225.

Our examination of the circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent in this case, however, would be stymied were our review limited to the incomplete record presented to the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, before we can conduct our § 2254(d)(2) analysis for the Batson claims at issue here, we must address the question of the scope of the state-court record that a federal court may consider in exercising habeas review.

A.

Petitioners argue that the record we should consult in evaluating their Batson claims includes the questionnaires for seated and alternate jurors and the transcript of the first day of voir dire—materials that they did not present to the California Court of Appeal. The State disagrees, arguing that Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011), forbids consideration of materials that were not before the California Court of Appeal. We hold that the entirety of the existing state-court record should be considered.

In Pinholster, the Supreme Court considered whether AEDPA "permits consideration of evidence introduced in an evidentiary hearing before [a] federal habeas court." 131 S.Ct. at 1398.7 The Court concluded that it does not. Id. The Court emphasized that the "backward-looking language" in § 2254(d) "requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made," and that "[t]he federal habeas scheme leaves primary responsibility with the state courts." Id. at 1398-99. Based on these concerns, the Court held that review under AEDPA "is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Id. at 1398.

In Jamerson we examined whether Pinholster forbade us from considering evidence that was not presented to the state appellate court if that evidence (or equivalent evidence) had been presented to the state trial court. Specifically, the habeas petitioner in Jamerson asked us to consider—in ruling on his Batson claim—"driver's license photographs that [he] submitted to show the race of each venire member." Jamerson, 713 F.3d at 1226. The photographs in question had not been presented to the California Court of Appeal. Instead, that court had reviewed only "the transcripts of voir dire, which did not reveal the racial makeup of the entire jury venire." Id. The State argued in Jamerson that, because the California Court of Appeal "did not know the race of each jury venire member," Pinholster forbade us from considering the photographs. Jamerson, 713 F.3d at 1226. We disagreed, holding that "Pinholster allows us to consider photographs that show the racial composition of a jury venire to the extent that those photographs merely reconstruct facts visible to the state trial court that ruled on the petitioner's Batson challenge." Id. at 1227. In other words, we held that Pinholster allowed us to consider information that was available to the state trial court, even if that information was not also presented to the state appellate court.

Today we reaffirm our reasoning in Jamerson. Federal courts sitting in habeas may consider the entire state-court record, not merely those materials that were presented to state appellate courts. As Jamerson correctly explained, "Pinholster's concerns are not implicated" when a federal habeas court is asked to consider evidence that was presented to the state trial court, whether or not that evidence was subsequently presented to a state appellate court. Jamerson, 713 F.3d at 1226-27. "Pinholster itself precluded review only of evidence that was never revealed in any state court proceeding," id. at 1227, and the Supreme Court's reasoning counsels against extending its holding beyond that scenario. Pinholster turned on the observation that habeas review under AEDPA is "backward-looking," requiring "an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made." 131 S.Ct. at 1398. The Supreme Court thus held that "the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that same time." Id. Such backward-looking review does not limit our ability to consider a state-trial-court record that existed at the time a state-appellate-court decision was made.8 Nor does consultation of that record implicate Pinholster's broader commitment to "ensuring that the state's consideration of a petitioner's claims [a]re the `main event' rather than a `tryout on the road' to federal court." Jamerson, 713 F.3d at 1226 (quoting Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398-1401). That commitment reflects a concern with the division of authority between state and federal courts, not a concern with the division of authority between two different state courts.

In short, as we held in Jamerson, "nothing in Pinholster inherently limits this court's review to evidence that the state appellate court—as opposed to the state trial court—considered." 713 F.3d at 1227.

B.

Having clarified the scope of the record that should be considered in evaluating Petitioners' Batson claims, we are left with the need to implement this conclusion by conducting a § 2254(d)(2) analysis based on the entire state-court record. At the present juncture, we decline to express an opinion as to whether the failure to conduct a comparative juror analysis resulted in an unreasonable determination of the facts in this case, as we find it appropriate to leave this determination to be made by the original three-judge panel in the first instance.

"Although an en banc court takes a case, not an issue, en banc, it has the discretion to decide the entire case or only the parts of the case that formed the basis for the en banc call." Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1135 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citing Summerlin v. Stewart, 309 F.3d 1193, 1193 (9th Cir.2002)). Remand to the original three-judge panel of issues extraneous to an en banc call is at times a useful mechanism to conserve judicial resources and achieve an expeditious resolution of issues on appeal. Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc); see also Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1326 (9th Cir.2015) (en banc) (returning the case to the original three-judge panel for consideration of additional issues raised on appeal); Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc) (remanding to the three-judge panel to implement the en banc court's conclusion); Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation v. Washington, 550 F.2d 443, 449 (9th Cir.1977) (en banc) (remanding the case "to the panel before which it initially was heard to consider the other issues involved"). Such is the case here, where our resolution of the narrow legal question that motivated the en banc call broadens the factual record that remains to be evaluated. We therefore elect to send this appeal back to the previously assigned three-judge panel to address whether the California Court of Appeal reasonably adjudicated Petitioners' Batson claims within the meaning of § 2254(d)(2).

V.

We have concluded that the California Court of Appeal's adjudication of Petitioners' Batson claims was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Batson, or its pre-2003 progeny, within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1). We have also concluded that whether the California Court of Appeal's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts within the meaning of § 2254(d)(2) would be more appropriately evaluated by the original three-judge panel than by this en banc panel, and we have clarified the scope of the record that the three-judge panel should consider in performing its review. We therefore return the case to the three-judge panel for further evaluation of Petitioners' Batson claims. We address Petitioners' remaining claims in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

REMANDED to the three-judge panel.

IKUTA, Circuit Judge, joined by TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, concurring:

I write separately to address a question raised by the majority: whether Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005), established a new procedural rule that a state court must use comparative juror analysis when adjudicating a Batson claim, such that a failure to do so results in a decision that is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Maj. Op. at 777. For the reasons explained below, Miller-El II could not and did not establish any such rule.

AEDPA provides that a federal court may not grant habeas relief to "a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court . . . with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless that state-court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). When evaluating a claim under § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court has instructed us to measure state-court decisions against rules that were clearly established by the Supreme Court's precedents "as of the time the state court renders its decision." Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 38, 44, 181 L.Ed.2d 336 (2011) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Because "`clearly established Federal law' in § 2254(d)(1) `refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision,'" Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)), "it is not `an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law' for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme] Court," Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) (quoting § 2254(d)(1)); see also Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125-26, 128 S.Ct. 743, 169 L.Ed.2d 583 (2008) (indicating that a Supreme Court rule is not "clearly established" unless it "squarely addresses" the issues in a case or gives a "clear answer to the question presented").

Under this framework, a Supreme Court decision establishes a new procedural rule binding on state courts only if the decision (1) squarely establishes a specific legal rule, and (2) the rule was necessary to the disposition of the case, and therefore is not merely dictum. The Supreme Court's decision in Miller-El II meets neither of these requirements.

In Miller-El II, a petitioner sought habeas relief, claiming that his Batson rights had been violated after the state court made a "determination of fact that the State's race-neutral explanations were true." 545 U.S. at 240, 125 S.Ct. 2317. The Supreme Court did not ask whether the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Batson under § 2254(d)(1). Rather, the Supreme Court analyzed the claim as a factual question under § 2254(d)(2): whether the state court's application of Batson had involved an unreasonable determination of the facts. Id. Indeed, the Court stated that the prisoner could "obtain relief only by showing the Texas conclusion to be `an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding'" under § 2254(d)(2). Id. (emphasis added). After making "side-by-side comparisons" of venire members who had been struck and allowed to serve, id. at 241, the Court determined that the state court had made an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), and therefore granted the writ. Id. at 266.

Because Miller-El II considered only whether the state court made an unreasonable factual determination, the Supreme Court did not discuss, let alone "squarely establish," a new procedural rule that state courts must conduct comparative juror analysis when evaluating a Batson claim. At no point did Miller-El II suggest that the state court in that case violated the petitioner's constitutional rights by failing to adhere to such a procedural rule. Accordingly, because Miller-El II does not provide a "clear answer," Van Patten, 552 U.S. at 126, 128 S.Ct. 743, to the question whether a state court must conduct comparative juror analysis as part of its Batson inquiry, we cannot hold that a state court which fails to conduct comparative juror analysis violates clearly established Federal law, as determined by Miller-El II.

Even if a court concluded that Miller-El II somehow implicitly stands for the principle that state courts must always engage in comparative juror analysis when making a Batson inquiry, this principle would not be the Supreme Court's holding in that case. While the Supreme Court issued its decision in Miller-El II in 2005, the state court rendered its underlying decision in 1992. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 237, 125 S.Ct. 2317. Because "§ 2254(d)(1) requires federal courts . . . to measure state-court decisions against [Supreme Court] precedents as of the time the state court renders its decision," Greene, 132 S.Ct. at 44 (emphasis removed) (internal quotation marks omitted), the Supreme Court could not have granted the writ in Miller-El II on the ground the state court unreasonably applied any rule created by Miller-El II. There is no dispute that at the time of the underlying state court decision, the Supreme Court had not enunciated a rule, implicit or otherwise, requiring comparative juror analysis in Batson inquiries. For this reason, the holding of Miller-El II was that the state court made an unreasonable factual finding, not that it violated clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, even if it were possible to read Miller-El II as implicitly enunciating a procedural rule that state courts must always engage in comparative juror analysis when conducting a Batson inquiry, such a rule would have been unnecessary to the Supreme Court's disposition in that case, and therefore not binding on state courts in the AEDPA context. See Carey, 549 U.S. at 74, 127 S.Ct. 649.

In recognition of these principles, we have held that "Miller-El II merely clarif[ied] Batson and [did] not establish new rules of criminal procedure." Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006). Said otherwise, "[t]his court has already addressed and rejected [the] argument that a state court's failure to conduct a comparative juror analysis was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1)." Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218, 1224 n. 1 (9th Cir.2013); see also Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1005 (9th Cir.2014) (rejecting the habeas petitioner's claim that "a comprehensive, formal comparative juror analysis" was a "per se legal requirement of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," because "Miller-El [II] did not establish any such principle of law").1 This precedent is binding on any subsequent three-judge panel.

While Miller-El II did not establish a new constitutional rule for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), it did suggest that a state court's failure to examine comparative juror evidence could, under some circumstances, result in an "unreasonable determination of the facts" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See, e.g., Jamerson, 713 F.3d at 1224-25 & n. 1 (citing Briggs v. Grounds, 682 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012); Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810, 816 (9th Cir.2010); and Ali v. Hickman, 584 F.3d 1174, 1180-81 (9th Cir.2009)). For this reason, we have suggested that "California courts may wish to revisit" their analysis of Batson claims in light of Miller-El II, even though Miller-El II did not create a new rule. Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 360 n. 3 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc). While the failure to use comparative juror analysis would not render a state court's decision an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent under § 2254(d)(1), a state appellate court could be objectively unreasonable in concluding that a trial court's credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, if it failed to use this or other ordinary techniques for reviewing the record as part of its Batson inquiry.

Because Miller-El II "only . . . clarified the extant Batson three-step framework," and did not "create a new rule of criminal procedure," Boyd, 467 F.3d at 1146, the majority creates needless confusion by suggesting that there might be an open question as to whether Miller-El II established a rule that "[c]omparative juror analysis . . . must be considered when reviewing claims of error at [Batson's] third stage." Maj. op. at 777 (quoting People v. Lenix, 44 Cal.4th 602, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 187 P.3d 946, 950, 961 (2008)). There is no such open question, because it is clear that Miller-El II established no such rule. I otherwise concur in the majority's opinion.